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answered, viz., is the defendant in a state
court entitled to the instruction that his
failure to testify creates no presumption
against him? The defendant in a federal
court is entitled to this instruction, but the
basis for this right has always been merely
statutory.2 8
It appears that when the question does
arise the Supreme Court will hold that such
instruction is required, since an inference
of guilt drawn by a jury would penalize a
defendant for exercising his constitutional
right."9
As previously noted, the recent trend
of the Supreme Court has been to "ab-
sorb" specific procedural safeguards of the
bill of rights into the due process clause
thereby making them applicable to the
states.30 From a moral and logical point
28See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287
(1939).
29See Griffin v. California, supra note 20, at
614-15.
0 See note 22 supra.
State not Required
to Provide Counsel
on Appeal to Supreme Court
Appellant, an indigent, was convicted of
escaping from an honor farm of the state
penitentiary. He filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the district court, asserting that
the rights afforded him by the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment had been violated by
the refusal of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico to appoint counsel to assist him in
appealing to the United States Supreme
Court. The district court denied relief. The
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of view, there seems to be little doubt that
a defendant in a state criminal prosecution
should be protected by the fundamental
procedural safeguards found in the bill of
rights. However, one vital question still
remains: is the Supreme Court constitu-
tionally justified in finding that these pro-
cedural safeguards are contained in the
due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
If, as a minority of the Justices have
stated, the Court has expanded the concept
of due process beyond all rational basis,",
then the Supreme Court has, in effect,
usurped the authority of Congress and has
effected by judicial decision what can prop-
erly be done only by constitutional amend-
ment.
31 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opin-
ion in Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 22, at 14;
see also Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorpo-
ration" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
Court of Appeals affirmed and held that a
state court is not required to appoint coun-
sel for an indigent in taking such an ap-
peal. Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th
Cir. 1965).
The right to counsel has been recognized
in federal criminal proceedings since the
adoption of the federal constitution.' Al-
though the unqualified right existed, the
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
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exercise of this right was dependent upon
the defendant's ability to remunerate coun-
sel for his services. There was, therefore,
unequal treatment of the rich and the poor,
which tenaciously remained until the deci-
sion in Johnson v. Zerbst.2
In Zerbst, the Supreme Court held that
the sixth amendment enjoined the federal
courts from denying any defendant repre-
sentation by counsel unless he had waived
this right. 3 Since this holding was appli-
cable only to the federal courts, the ques-
tion of the indigent's right to court-
appointed counsel in a state court re-
mained unanswered.
The decision in Powell v. Alabama4
provided a partial answer. Seven defend-
ants, convicted of rape, a capital offense
under Alabama law, filed a petition for
habeas corpus, contending that the failure
of the trial court to provide counsel, before
the date of trial, was a denial of due
process. The Supreme Court held that,
considering the youth and ignorance of the
defendants, as well as the penalty, "the
necessity of counsel was so vital and im-
perative that the failure of the trial court
to make an effective appointment of coun-
sel was likewise a denial of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."5 It should be emphasized
2 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3 Id. at 463; see Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 1, 9 (1944).
4 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5 Id. at 71; see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940), for a discussion of the nature of
effective appointment of counsel. The Court there
stated that "the denial of opportunity for ap-
pointed counsel to confer, to consult with the
accused and to prepare his defense, could convert
the appointment of counsel into a sham and
nothing more than a formal compliance with
the Constitution's requirement that the accused
be given the assistance of counsel." Id. at 446.
that it was not the question of indigency
which was before the Court, but rather,
the general inability to secure counsel.
The question of indigency was dealt
with by the Supreme Court in Betts v.
Brady.6 Betts was convicted of a non-
capital felony at a trial wherein the court
had refused to appoint counsel although
the defendant was financially unable to
secure representation. The Supreme Court,
in affirming the conviction, stated that the
sixth amendment's guarantee of a right to
counsel applied only to trials in the fed-
eral courts.7 The Court added, however,
that there could be certain circumstances
under which denial of counsel would be
the equivalent of a denial of due process."
While Powell clearly enunciated the "ne-
cessity of counsel," Betts made the right
to counsel effective only in cases of "spe-
cial circumstances." 9 Betts was the bridge
between the theoretical right to counsel
and its practical application-the latter,
was finally realized in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.t 0
Gideon, convicted of a felony, alleged
that denial of court-appointed counsel was
a breach of the sixth amendment. The
Supreme Court reversed his conviction,
maintaining that such a denial in a felony
trial was, indeed, violative of due process.
6316 U.S. 455 (1942).
71d. at 461.
8 Id. at 461-62.
9 The "special circumstances" rule has been ad-
hered to when certain factors were present, viz.,
questionable intelligence and ability to under-
stand the proceedings. (Moore v. Michigan, 355
U.S. 155 (1957)); the peculiar circumstances of
the crime (Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962)); the pleading of a defense at the ar-
raignment which would be sufficient to demand
the appointment of counsel (Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)).
10 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gideon provides for the appointment of
counsel to the indigent on the trial level-
does it follow that a state court must fur-
nish an attorney to aid the indigent in tak-
ing an appeal? The instant case answered
this question in the negative, stating that
there is no right to court-appointed counsel
when appealing from a state court to the
Supreme Court." Since no authority was
cited or found "requiring or even permit-
ting a state supreme court to appoint coun-
sel for an indigent ... on his appeal to the
United States Supreme Court,' 1 2 the
Court in Peters felt itself unable to act.
It is true that there is no authority which
directs a state court to appoint counsel
under the circumstances of the principal
case. However, Douglas v. California,3
specifically cited by the court in the instant
case, indicated the potential permissibility
of court-appointed counsel in an appeal
of this nature.
In Douglas, indigent petitioners were
convicted of thirteen felonies and sen-
tenced to imprisonment. On appeal as of
right, the California state court refused to
appoint counsel since, on review of the
merits, the appeal was thought to be of
such a nature as to preclude success. 14
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
where the merits of the indigent's initial
appeal in the state courts are presented
without benefit of counsel, such a dis-
crimination exists between rich and poor
as to be violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 5 The Court specifically restricted
its holding to the question of an appeal in
a state court, and stated that it was not
"1 Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965).
12 ibid.
13 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
14 187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 812, 10 Cal. Rep. 188,
195 (1960).
15 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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considering the indigent's plight in taking
an appeal from the state to the United
States Supreme Court.16
The tenth circuit, in precluding the in-
digent's effective appeal in the instant case,
limited its consideration of Douglas to the
narrow question formally answered there-
in, i.e., appeals to state courts. It would
appear that the Court's unwarranted de-
mand for direct precedent as a prerequisite
to favorable action is unrealistic in view
of the developing trend in American law
which has looked with disfavor upon the
invidious system which would allow the
kind of appeal a man enjoys to depend
"on the amount of money he has."' 7
Judge Learned Hand once remarked,
"if we are to keep our democracy there
must be one commandment: Thou shalt
(Continued on page 264)
16 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
an opinion was expressed which demonstrates
the almost inevitable results of such a decision
as that in the principal case. Acknowledging that
even the educated layman generally lacks any
skill in the law, the Court proceeded to point
out that no amount of intelligence or education
can replace the guiding hand of counsel. If the
intelligent have this need, without which they
risk the danger of conviction due to an inability
to establish their innocence, "how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect." Id. at 69.
Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 10,
where the Court asserted: "reason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. ... There are few defendants charged
with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyer they can get to prepare and present their
defenses. That government hires lawyers to pro-
secute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications
of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities not luxuries." Id. at 344.
17 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
past several centuries. In a negative fash-
ion, the symposium is enlightening because
it brings home the fact that broad based
acceptance of natural law 'by American
thinkers is not close at hand. Running
throughout the commentaries upon Profes-
sor Rommen's paper is the viewpoint that
natural law represents either a closed legal
system or a lowest common denominator
among legal philosophies which hold forth
man's "fulfillment" as the end of law. Pro-
fessor Friedman, for example, posits that
while man seeks enduring standards and
certainty in lawmaking, nevertheless, even
the Nuremberg judgments may be sup-
ported on a purely positivistic basis.
The final section of the work, devoted to
Judicial Reasoning, contains contributions
from such scholars as Professors Freund,
Levi, Wechsler, and Henkin. This material
RACE RELATIONS
(Continued)
that we are talking of a sacrament capable
of producing, during the entire existence of
the marriage, those graces which will en-
able the couple to fulfill their Christian
DECISIONS
(Continued)
not ration justice." '18 Is not justice rationed
in favor of the wealthy defendant when he
is represented by proficient and experi-
enced counsel, as against the indigent who
is forced by decisions such as that in
Peters to prepare and present his own ap-
peal to the Supreme Court? Since the
Supreme Court has ordered counsel to be
appointed for indigents at criminal trials,
Is Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not
Meet The Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J.
435 (1963).
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continues the nationwide discussion
touched off by Professor Wechsler's theory
of "neutral principles." Interesting ques-
tions are raised concerning possible con-
flict between Professor Wechsler's formu-
lation and the Supreme Court's self-im-
posed limitation of deciding only the case
before it. Professor Levi contributes valu-
able insights on an important aspect of
stare decisis: is it more imperative when
the earlier decision interprets a statute
rather than a principle of common law.
This book is certainly not to ,be classed
as light reading. It is too eclectic to be of
real assistance to a student beginning his
inquiry into jurisprudence. It should, how-
ever, prove a valuable source for scholars
desiring to obtain a cross-section of cur-
rent views on the subjects of natural law,
civil disobedience, and the judicial process.
commitment. If we overlook this gracious
aspect of the sacrament of marriage or
even minimize it, we are in danger of re-
ducing the sacrament to a purely natural
state influenced only by economic, social,
or psychological pressures and motives.
the holding of Peters seems inconsistent
with the philosophy inherent in prior case
law. By virtue of the instant case, the in-
digent's guarantee of representation will
be terminated not in a lower court, but
rather at the doorstep of the court from
which that guarantee emanates. It becomes
evident that only with respect to appeals
to the Supreme Court will the discrimina-
tion between rich and poor, arising from
a denial of appointed counsel, survive.
This, in the very court which so em-
phatically condemned any discriminatory
practice based on wealth!
